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Separation of Church and State, Neutrality, and Religious Freedom in 
American Constitutional Law 
Robert A. Sedler, Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University 
 
Abstract 
Religious freedom is a favored value under the United States Constitution. The Constitution 
provides two-fold protection to religious freedom by means of the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause protects against the “establishment” of an 
official church by the government and against governmental action “establishing religion,” while 
the Free Exercise clause is a textual guarantee of peoples’ right to practice their religion and to 
hold and act on religious beliefs, free from governmental interference.  The Establishment 
Clause would appear to an outside observer as strongly endorsing the concept of separation of 
church and state, and the Supreme Court has sometimes referred to the Establishment Clause as 
creating a “wall of separation” between church and state. However, the concept of separation of 
church and state has not in theory or practice guided the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. To the contrary, the Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause not as 
requiring separation of church and state in the sense that the government may not constitutionally 
become involved with religion, but as only requiring that the government must maintain a course 
of complete official neutrality toward religion. This means that the government may not favor 
one religion over another religion and may not favor religious belief over non-religious belief. 
But as a constitutional matter, the government may become involved with religion in a number 
of ways so long as it maintains a course of complete official neutrality toward religion.  It is the 
thesis of this paper that the guiding force governing the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence has been a concern with protecting religious freedom, and that the Court will only 
find an Establishment Clause violation when the law or governmental action in question has the 
potential for interfering with the religious freedom of individuals or groups who are not the 
beneficiaries of that law or governmental action. While the cases demonstrate that the Court has 
found many Establishment Clause violations over the years, the Court has also upheld laws or 
governmental actions that have the effect of treating religion equally with non-religion. This 
trend has been particularly evident in recent years with respect to the government’s including the 
religious with the secular in the receipt of governmental benefits. The Court has also upheld 
against Establishment Clause challenge governmental actions that are precisely tailored to 
protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.  In the final analysis, as 
this paper will demonstrate, the function of the Establishment Clause in the American 
constitutional system is to protect religious freedom by requiring that the government maintain a 
course of complete official neutrality toward religion. The government is not required by the 
Establishment Clause to be hostile toward religion, but to the contrary may treat the religious and 
the secular equally and may act affirmatively to protect the religious freedom of individuals and 
religious institutions. 
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I. Introduction 
Religious freedom is a favored value in the American constitutional system. 
It is the first guarantee of the First Amendment, which provides that there shall be “[n]o law 
respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 The First 
Amendment was enacted against the background of an established church in Great Britain during 
the colonial period and the official persecution of religious dissenters in Great Britain and 
colonial America.
2
 It  provides a two-fold protection to religious freedom by what we refer to as 
the “religion clauses.” The Establishment Clause protects against the “establishment” of an 
official church by the government and against governmental action “establishing religion,” while 
the Free Exercise clause is a textual guarantee of peoples’ right to practice their religion and to 
hold and act on religious beliefs, free from governmental interference. 
3
 
                                                          
 
1
 U.S.CONST.amend. I. While the guarantees of the Bill of Rights by their terms apply only to the federal 
government, the major guarantees of the Bill of Rights, such as the religion clauses, have been incorporated into the 
“liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and so apply equally to the states. See the 
discussion in the concurring opinion of Justice William Brennan in School District of Abington Township, 
Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230-234 (1963) (Brennan J., concurring). 
 
2
 See the discussion of the historical background of the religion clauses of the First Amendment in Everson v. New 
Jersey, 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947). 
 
3
 As the Supreme Court has stated: “The structure of our government has, for the preservation of religious liberty, 
rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from 
the invasion of civil authority.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
 Religious freedom means freedom with respect to religious belief - the belief in the existence or non-existence of a 
Supreme Being, and the nature and manifestation of such existence. In this sense, all people, secularists, atheists and 
agnostics, as well as religious adherents, have religious beliefs, and the religion clauses protect peoples’ freedom 
with respect to those beliefs. 
            The two-fold protection of religious freedom under the American Constitution is a distinctly American phenomenon. 
It is possible in a democratic society for governmental establishment of religion to coexist fully with religious 
freedom. This is clearly the situation in Great Britain. In Great Britain, there is not only the officially-established 
Church of England and Church of Scotland, supported by public funds, but the government aids other religions by 
providing substantial public funds to sectarian schools. See the discussion of governmental funding of sectarian 
schools in Governing Body of JFS and the Admission Panel of JFS and others [2009] UKSC 15, 63-65 (Judgment of 
Lord Hope), [2010] IRLR 136.  At the same time,  Great Britain affirmatively protects religious freedom by its 
enactment human rights laws and its adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights,  much in the same 
way and to the same extent as religious freedom is protected under the Free Exercise Clause in the United States. 
See e.g., R (on the application of SB) v. Governors of Denbigh High School, 2 All ER 396 [2005], 2005 EXCA Civ 
1999 (school could not require student to wear school uniform instead of jilbab, which she claimed was required by 
her Moslem religion); R (on the application of Suryanada [2007] EWHC 1736 (Q.B.Admin) (proposed slaughter of 
bullock solely on basis of bullock’s testing positively for bovine tuberculosis violated religious freedom of Hindu 
community). Similarly, in Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains a freedom of conscience and 
religion clause, but no establishment clause. The reason for this is that in Canada the government continues to 
support Protestant and Catholic sectarian schools as part of the pact between the Founding Nations at the time of 
Confederation.See Adler v. Ontario [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, where the Supreme Court of Canada held that the refusal 
of the province to fund the sectarian schools operated by other religious groups did not violate the freedom of 
conscience and religion or the equality provisions of the Charter. Compare Re Zylberberg and Director of Education 
of Sudbury Board of Education, 65 O.R.2d 641 (Ontario Court of Appeal 1988), holding that a requirement that 
public school students participate in school-sponsored prayer violated the freedom of conscience and religion clause 
of the Charter. But our approach is different, and as a matter of constitutional structure, in the United States we 
protect religious freedom both by prohibiting the government from “advancing or inhibiting religion” - the 
Establishment Clause requires that the government pursue a policy of complete official neutrality toward religion - 
Forum on Public Policy 
3 
           The Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause very broadly to protect 
religious freedom, and as a consequence, the Establishment Clause has supplanted the Free 
Exercise Clause as the primary means of protecting religious freedom under the American 
Constitution.
4
 
   
 The Establishment Clause would appear to an outside observer as strongly endorsing the 
concept of separation of church and state, and the Supreme Court has sometimes referred to the 
Establishment Clause as creating a “wall of separation” between church and state.5 However, the 
concept of separation of church and state has not in theory or practice guided the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. To the contrary, the Court has interpreted the Establishment 
Clause not as requiring separation of church and state in the literal sense that the government 
may not constitutionally become involved with religion, but only as requiring that the 
government must maintain a course of complete official neutrality toward religion. The 
requirement of complete official neutrality toward religion is the overriding principle of the 
Establishment Clause. Under this overriding principle, the government cannot favor one religion 
over another religion and cannot favor religious belief over non-religious belief.
6
 The overriding 
principle of complete official neutrality toward religion has replaced the earlier “wall of 
separation concept.
7
 Or to put it another way, under the Establishment Clause, the objectives to 
be achieved by the concept of separation of church and state are achieved by the requirement of 
complete official neutrality toward religion. This means that as a constitutional matter, the 
government may become involved with religion in a number of ways so long as it maintains a 
course of complete official neutrality toward religion. 
 
The neutrality principle furthers the “objective of separation, by precluding the 
government from favoring religion, but at the same time, it does not require the government to be 
hostile to religion.
8
 Because the Establishment Clause does not require the government to be 
hostile to religion, obviously, the government can include religious institutions in the services it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and by specifically guaranteeing religious freedom. In the United States, as we will see, any school-sponsored prayer 
in the public schools violates the Establishment Clause, so its is not necessary for the courts to decide whether the 
imposition of the requirement that students participate in school sponsored prayer violates the Free Exercise Clause. 
 
4
 See the discussion of this point in Robert A. Sedler, “The Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty in the 
United States,” 2010 FORUM ON PUBLIC POLICY ON LINE, Vol.5, pp.9-10. 
 
5
 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 146, 164 (1879). In 
Everson, the first modern Establishment Clause case, Justice Black, writing for the Court stated: “in the words of 
Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a ‘wall of separation’ 
between church and State.” Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164). 
 
6
 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1981). 
 
7
 The problems with the “wall of separation” concept were pointed out by Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U.S. 306,312 (1952). Justice Douglas noted that while the First Amendment “reflects the philosophy that Church 
and State should be separated,” “[it] does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church 
and State.” Rather, “it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union 
or dependency one on the other.” 
 
8
 As the Court noted in Everson: “The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups 
of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to 
be used to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
Forum on Public Policy 
4 
provides to the public generally, such as police and fire  protection,
9
 and likewise, the 
government can include religious institutions among recipients of governmental funding to 
provide secular services.
10
 In addition, the principle of complete official neutrality is not 
breached when the government provides religious organizations with equal access to 
governmental facilities, such as access to a public forum. This being so, such equal access is 
required by the First Amendment freedom of speech principle of content neutrality.
11
 And as we 
will see, at least in certain circumstances, the Court has held that the government does not violate 
the Establishment Clause when it includes the religious with the secular in the receipt of 
governmental benefits. 
  
It is the thesis of this paper that the guiding force governing the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been a concern with protecting religious freedom. This 
being so, I maintain that the Court has found an Establishment Clause violation only when the 
law or governmental action in question has the potential for interfering with the religious 
freedom of individuals or groups who are not the beneficiaries of that law or governmental 
action. While the cases demonstrate that the Court has found many Establishment Clause 
violations over the years, the Court has also upheld laws or governmental actions that have the 
effect of treating religion equally with non-religion. This trend has been particularly evident in 
recent years with respect to the government’s including the religious with the secular in the 
receipt of governmental benefits. The Court has also upheld against Establishment Clause 
challenge governmental actions that are precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of 
individuals and religious institutions. 
 
           I will now discuss the four situations where the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence can be demonstrated to have been guided by a concern for protecting religious 
freedom. One, the Court has held unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause all 
governmental actions that have had the effect of favoring one religious belief over another 
religious belief or of favoring religious belief over non-religious belief. In so doing, the Court 
has protected the religious freedom of those persons who do not share the favored religious 
beliefs. Two, the Court has protected the religious freedom of religious institutions and their 
adherents by holding that under the Establishment Clause
0
 the government cannot become 
involved in matters of religious doctrine or policy and must respect the religiously-based 
decisions of religious institutions. Three, the Court has held that at least in some circumstances, 
                                                          
 
9
 As Professor Laycock has noted, police and fire protection are such a universal part of our lives that they have 
become part of the baseline, and to deny them to churches would put religion outside the protection of the law.” 
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L.REV. 993, 
1005 (1990). 
 
10
 See the discussion in Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause, infra, note 12 at 1374-1376. 
 
11
 See the discussion, Id. at 1331-1338, 1392-1393. See also Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 
98 (2001) for a discussion of the equal access of religious speech to a designated public forum, here the use of after-
school facilities in a public school. 
 
0
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the Establishment Clause permits the government to include the religious with the secular in the 
receipt of governmental benefits, and to that extent the Establishment Clause protects the 
religious freedom of religious institutions and religious adherents. Fourth, the Court has held that 
the Establishment Clause permits the government to take actions that are precisely tailored to 
protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions. 
 
II. The Establishment Clause and Protecting Religious Freedom 
 
A. Governmental Action Advancing Religion 
The most important operative principle of the Establishment Clause is that the government may 
not take any action that has the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
12
  Most of 
the cases decided under this operative principle involve the situation where the government has 
taken action that favors religion over non-religion and sometimes that favors a particular religion 
over another. First off, the government may not provide public funds to support the religious 
activities of churches and other religious institutions. In Everson, Justice Black stated a core 
meaning of the Establishment Clause: “No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to 
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form 
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” 13 Professor Jesse Choper has observed, “There is 
broad consensus that a central threat to the religious freedom of individuals and groups-indeed, 
in the judgment of many, ‘the most serious infringement upon religious liberty'-is posed by 
‘forcing them to pay taxes in support of a religious establishment or religious activities.’”14  In 
addition to precluding the government from providing public funds to churches to be used for 
religious activities, the government may not provide public funds directly to sectarian schools, 
such as funds for the maintenance and repair of parochial school buildings,
15
 or an unrestricted 
lump-sum grant, purportedly designed to reimburse the parochial schools for the expenses 
                                                          
 
12
 Some years ago, I published a lengthy law review article in which I attempted to explicate the structure of the 
Establishment Clause from the perspective of constitutional litigation. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the 
Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE LAW REVIEW 1317 (1997). I 
have recently completed a revisit and updating of that article, Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment 
Clause: A Revisit which will be published in the Wayne Law Review in 2014. In the article, I explain the 
Establishment Clause as consisting of four components. An overriding principle: complete official neutrality toward 
religion; three operative principles; subsidiary doctrines, and precedents in the main areas of Establishment Clause 
Litigation. The three operative principles are based on what is called the Lemon test, first propounded by the Court 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971), but reflecting “the cumulative criteria developed by the Court 
over many years.” The first operative principle is that the law or governmental action must have a secular legislative 
purpose. The second operative principle is that the principal or primary effect of the law or governmental action 
must be neither to advance nor inhibit religion. The third operative principle is that the challenged law or 
governmental action may not foster “excessive governmental entanglement with religion.” If either operative 
principle is violated, the law or governmental action violates the Establishment Clause. In actual litigation, the 
operative principles  serve as the point of departure for Establishment Clause analysis. The Lemon operative 
principles are discussed in Understanding the Establishment Clause, 43 WAYNE LAW REVIEW at 1343-1351. 
 
13
 Everson v. Board of Education, supra, note 2 at 15-16. 
 
14
 Jesse H. Choper SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 
THE RELIGION CLAUSES 16 (1995). 
 
15
 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
Forum on Public Policy 
6 
mandated by state law,
16
 or funds to supplement the salaries of parochial school teachers in 
secular subjects.
17
 By prohibiting the government from providing funds to churches and religious 
institutions to support religious activities, the government is thereby protecting the religious 
freedom of those persons who are not members of the church or religious institution. An 
essential component of religious freedom in the United States then is the right to be free from 
taxation for the benefit of churches and religious institutions. 
 
Next, under this operative principle the Court has held unconstitutional all state-
sponsored religious practices in the public schools, such as school-sponsored prayers and bible-
reading,
18
 the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms,
19
 a 
“moment of silence” designed to encourage school prayer,20 and school-sponsored prayers at 
school commencements and athletic events.
21
 Moreover, the government may not try to advance 
a biblical view of creation by prohibiting the teaching of evolution in the public schools,
22,” or 
by requiring the teaching of “creation science” in addition to evolution, based on the Court’s 
factual finding that “creation science” was not science, but religion masquerading as science.23   
                                                          
 
16
 Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1977). 
 
17
 Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, note 12. However, as will be discussed subsequently, infra, note 52 the Establishment 
Clause does not prohibit the government from providing funds for secular purposes to most religiously-affiliated 
colleges and universities, since they are sufficiently similar to secular colleges and universities in their operation and 
function. The Establishment Clause generally permits the government to provide aid to religious institutions in order 
to enable them to perform a secular function. 
 
18
 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),  
 
19
 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 
20
 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 
21
 Lee v. Weissman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); 
 
22
 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 
23
 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).The most recent attempt to undermine the teaching of evolution in 
some school districts has been to counter evolution with “intelligent design,” purportedly an alternative “scientific” 
explanation of the origin of human life. Applying these precedents to the teaching of “intelligent design, a federal 
court held an extensive evidentiary hearing, and made comprehensive findings to the effect that like “creation 
science, “ ”intelligent design was not science, but religion masquerading as science, so that the teaching of 
“intelligent design” in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School 
District, 400 F.Supp.2d 707 (M.D.Pa.2005). The effect of the District Court decision was to ban the teaching of 
“intelligent design” as effectively as if the decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court. The findings were not 
only comprehensive, but so strongly supported by expert scientific testimony as to be unassailable. Any school 
district motivated to try to put “intelligent design” into the curriculum would be advised by the school board 
attorney that the district would be sued in federal court and the federal judge, relying on the findings in the Dover 
case, would hold the practice to be violative of the Establishment Clause. 
         In Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education v. Freiler, 185 F.3d 337 (5
th
 Cir. 1999), cert.denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000), a 
school board adopted a resolution that required the teaching of evolution in the schools to be accompanied by a 
disclaimer to the effect that “the lesson to be presented, regarding the origin of life and manner, is known as the 
Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be presented to inform students of the Scientific Theory of Evolution and 
should be presented to inform students of the scientific concept and not intended to influence or dissuade the 
Biblical version of Creation or an other concept.” It went on to state that, “Students are urged to exercise critical 
thinking and gather all information possible and closely examine each alternative toward forming an opinion.” The 
Fifth Circuit found that the disclaimer violated the second Lemon prong, because its primary effect was to “maintain 
a particular religious viewpoint, namely belief in the Biblical version of creation.” 185 F.3d at 346-348. The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, over the dissent of Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Forum on Public Policy 
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This operative principle also precludes the government from sponsoring a display of an 
unadorned religious symbol, such as a Nativity Scene, on public property.
24
  The display of the 
Nativity Scene, standing alone, would perceived by an objective observer as sending a message 
of endorsement of Christianity and a message to non-Christians that they are “outsiders and not 
full members of the political community.”25  Similarly, the government may not sponsor displays 
on public property of the Ten Commandments, because the Ten Commandments is a sacred 
religious text for the Jewish and Christian faiths, and so endorses the religious beliefs of those 
faiths over other religious beliefs.
26
 By prohibiting the government from using its power to 
endorse the religious beliefs of some faiths over others, the Establishment Clause protects the 
religious freedom of those who do not share the “favored” religious beliefs. Again, the 
overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is that the government must maintain a course 
of complete official neutrality toward religion, and so cannot favor one set of religious beliefs 
over another set of religious beliefs and cannot treat those who do not share the “favored” beliefs 
as “outsiders and not full members of the political community.27 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Thomas, who maintained that the disclaimer was sufficiently neutral and had the secular effect of advancing 
freedom of thought.530 U.S. at 1251 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 
24
 Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The same result was reached in an 
earlier lower court case litigated by the author. American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 
1561 (6
th
 Cir.1986)   . However, in the United States, Christmas, despite its historically religious origin is observed 
primarily as a secular holiday. It is the “national holiday of gift-giving,” so to speak. For this reason, the Court has 
held that the government may celebrate Christmas as a secular holiday, so that the inclusion of a Nativity Scene in a 
governmentally-sponsored Christmas holiday display, containing a Santa Claus, Christmas trees, and other secular 
and commercial symbols of the Christmas season, does not have the religious effect of endorsing Christianity and so 
does not violate the Establishment Clause. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Similarly, in Allegheny County 
the Court held that the display of Chanukah Menorah, a Jewish religious symbol, which could not be displayed by 
the government, standing alone, could be included in a governmentally-sponsored “Salute to Liberty” display next to 
a large Christmas tree and a “Salute to Liberty” sign. 
 
25
 See the discussion of this point by former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly, 
supra, note 24 at 687-689. . 
 
26
 McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). While the 
display of the Ten Commandments, standing alone, would be unconstitutional as an endorsement of the religious 
teachings of the Christian faiths, the inclusion of the Ten Commandments in a broader display of historical 
documents, showing the foundations of American law,” would have a secular purpose and effect, and so would be 
unconstitutional. C.f.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), decided the same day as McCreary, where the 
Court held that the display of a monument donated by a private organization that was inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments on the grounds of the Texas state capitol, along with 17 other monuments and 21 historical markers 
commemorating the “people, ideals and events that compose Texas identity,” had a primarily secular effect and so 
did not violate the Establishment Clause. However, in McCreary, the governmental bodies began by posting copies 
of the Ten Commandments standing alone in governmental buildings. It was only after the federal courts had held 
that the posting of those copies of the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment Clause that the governmental 
bodies came up with a new display, consisting of a framed copy of the Ten Commandments, and nine other 
documents, such as the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Mayflower Compact, and the like.  The 
Court found that the new display was undertaken for the religious purpose of displaying the Ten Commandments. 
This being so, the display violated the first s24 Lemon operative principle prohibiting governmental actions 
undertaken for a  religious purpose, and so violated the Establishment Clause. 
 
27
 Since the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from giving a preference for one religion over another 
religion, the Court has held that it violates the Establishment Clause for a state to require the registration as a 
charitable organization and so subject to more extensive regulation of those religious groups that receive more than 
half their funds from non-members. Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Similarly, both the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause invalidate laws that expressly discriminate against religion or against people 
Forum on Public Policy 
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B. Non-involvement with religious doctrine and religious institutions 
 
The third Lemon principle of excessive entanglement protects the religious freedom of religious 
institutions and their adherents in two ways. This principle means first that the civil courts may 
not become involved with matters of religious doctrine or policy, and must defer to the resolution 
of these issues by the highest tribunal of a hierarchial church authority. Thus, the courts cannot 
interfere with the decisions of the appropriate ecclesiastical authority within the church as to 
what persons are entitled to serve as ecclesiastical officials.
28
 Nor may they become involved in 
disputes between church factions over control of church property, with each group claiming to 
have the “true faith.” Again, the courts must defer to the determination of this matter by the 
highest tribunal of a hierarchial church organization.
29
 However, where the form of church 
organization is congregational rather than hierarchial, the courts may, consistent with the 
Establishment Clause, apply general principles of contract and property law to determine which 
of the contending factions is entitled to the church property.
30
  
  
          Second, the excessive entanglement principle may prevent application of general laws to 
the activities of religious institutions. In this context, the excessive entanglement principle of the 
Establishment Clause may overlap with the Free Exercise Clause, but there is an important 
difference. The application of general laws to the activities of religious institutions would only 
raise a Free Exercise concern if that application significantly interfered with the ability of the 
religious institution to carry out its religious function. But under the excessive entanglement 
principle, the government may not apply a general law to the activities of a religious institutions 
if the application of the law to those activities would result in governmental interference with 
religious-based decisions of the religious institution. The interplay between the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise clause in this situation is illustrated by the recently-decided case of 
Hosana-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
because of their religious beliefs, such as a law that disqualifies members of the clergy from serving as legislators, 
see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), or a law requiring the declaration of a belief in the existence of God as a 
test for holding public office. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Art.VI, cl.3 of the Constitution specifically 
prohibits a religious test as a qualification for holding federal office. The Torasco decision requires the same result 
under the Establishment Clause, so that this prohibition binds the states as well. 
              It also must be remembered that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from favoring religious belief 
over non-religious belief. So a non-denominational religious display or non-denominational school-sponsored prayer 
would also violate the Establishment Clause.  
 
28
 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.696 (1976); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese, 280 U.S. 1 (1929). 
 
29
 See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 
(1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). These cases and the cases cited in the preceding footnote were 
recently discussed by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S.Ct. 694, 704-705 (2012), during the course of which the Court 
observed that, “Our decisions in that area confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a 
church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.” 
 
30
  See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
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Commission.
31
 In that case, the Court held that there was a “ministerial exception” to anti-
discrimination laws, and that only the religious institution could decide who had the status of a 
“minister” under the applicable religious law.32 
 
        The employee in this case was a member of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and was 
employed as a teacher at Hosana-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, a small 
Lutheran parochial school, operated by a Lutheran congregation, and offering a “Christ-entered 
education” to students in kindergarten through eighth grade. But under church law she was 
considered a “called” teacher rather than a lay teacher. While lay teachers were appointed by the 
school board, “called” teachers were regarded as having been called to their vocation by God 
through a congregation. To be eligible to receive a call from a congregation, a teacher had to 
satisfy certain academic requirements. One way of doing so was by completing a “colloquy” 
program at a Lutheran college or university. The program required candidates to take eight 
courses of theological study, obtain the endorsement of their local Synod district and pass an oral 
examination by a faculty committee. A teacher who met these requirements could be “called” by 
a local congregation. Once “called,” a teacher would receive the formal title of “Minister of 
Religion, Commissioned.” A commissioned minister served for an open-ended term, and at 
Hosana-Tabor, a call could only be rescinded for cause and by a supermajority vote of the 
congregation.
33
 
 
          The employee here was a “called” teacher. She taught secular courses and also taught a 
religion class four days a week, led the students in prayer and devotional exercises each day, and 
attended a weekly school-wide chapel service, which she led herself about twice a year.
34
 When 
she became ill with narcolepsy, the congregation put her on disability leave and later concluded 
that she would be unlikely to be physically capable of returning to work in the future. The 
congregation offered her a “peaceful release” from her call, and tried to negotiate her resignation 
from the school. She refused and threatened legal action against the congregation. The 
congregation then voted to rescind her call and sent her a letter of termination.
35
 
          
   The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought suit against 
Hosana-Tabor, alleging that the employee had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file a 
suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, (ADA),
36
  and the employee joined the suit, 
                                                          
 
31
 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012). 
 
32
 As Chief Justice Roberts observed in his opinion for the Court: “The Establishment Clause prevents the 
government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of 
religious groups to select their own . . . By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise 
Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. 
According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the 
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such decisions.” 132 Sup. Ct. at 702-703. 
 
33
 Id. at 699. 
 
34
 Id. at 700. 
 
35
 Id. 
 
36
 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq. 
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asserting a claim for unlawful retaliation both under the ADA and the state disabilities rights law. 
The suit sought her reinstatement to her former position and monetary relief.
37
 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception,” 
barring certain employment discrimination claims against religious institutions, but held that the 
employee did not qualify as a “minister” under the exception, because the duties of “called” 
teachers at the school were the same as the duties of lay teachers.
38
  
 
       The Supreme Court, citing the above cases holding that the courts cannot interfere with the 
decisions of the appropriate ecclesiastical authority within the church as to what persons are 
entitled to serve as ecclesiastical officials,
39
 The Court found that it was highly relevant that 
Hosana-Tabor held the employee out to be a “minister” after she had a completed a course of 
religious training, and that it was less relevant both that lay teachers performed the same 
religious duties as the “called” teacher and that the “called” teacher also performed secular 
duties.
40
 What appeared to be dispositive for the Court was that the church was entitled to decide 
who would be its ministers, and the ministerial exception” “ensures that the authority to select 
and control who will be minister to the faithful - - a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical - - is the 
church’s alone.”41 
 
             As Hosana-Tabor indicates, an entanglement problem  arises when a court or 
administrative agency in a suit against a religious institution either applies the law to invalidate a 
religiously-based action taken by the institution, or is required to interpret religious doctrine to 
order to resolve the particular dispute. Such a situation occurred in a case where a Catholic nun 
who had been denied tenure in the Canon Law department of the Catholic University of 
America, the national university of the American Catholic Church, brought a Title VII sex 
discrimination claim against the university. The United States Court of Appeals for the District 
                                                          
 
37
 Id. at 701. 
 
38
 Id. at 701-702. 
 
39
 Supra, notes 27-28, and accompanying text. 
 
40
 132 Sup.Ct. at 708-709. 
 
41
 Id. at 709 (citations omitted). The Court concluded as follows: “The interest of society in the enforcement of 
employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in 
choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been 
fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance 
for us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.” Id. at 710. The Court noted that it was 
not deciding in this case whether or not the “ministerial exception” would bar other types of suits by an employee 
against a church employer, including actions alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by the church employer. 
Id. 
           In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas stated that the fact that the church considered the employee a minister should 
be dispositive. 132 Sup.Ct. at 710-711 (Thomas, J., concurring). In another concurring opinion, Justices Alito and 
Kagan emphasized that the formal ordination and  designation of a church employee as a “minister” should not be 
controlling in deciding whether the church is entitled to invoke the “ministerial exception.” They pointed out that the 
use of the term “minister” or concept of ordination was not followed by some religious groups, and that what 
mattered here was that the employee performed important religious functions, so that the church alone had the right 
to decide for itself whether she was religiously qualified to remain in her office. 132 Sup.Ct. at 711-716 (Alito,J., 
and Kagan, J., concurring). 
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of Columbia Circuit concluded that the Establishment Clause precluded the civil courts from 
determining the validity of the claim, both because in so doing they would be required to 
evaluate the teacher's scholarship and her teaching of religious doctrine, and because the inquiry 
itself would intrude into the church's ability to make religious judgments about its officials.
42
 By 
the same token, both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise clause interact to protect 
the decision of a religious organization to terminate an employee who has engaged in conduct 
that violates the essential tenets of the religion and so renders the employee unfit to advance the 
organization’s religious mission, such as where a teacher  at a Catholic parochial school, who 
had been divorced and had not obtained an annulment of her prior marriage in the Catholic 
Church, remarried a man who had been baptized as a Catholic,
43
 or a teacher at a Catholic 
parochial school who engaged in sexual relations outside of marriage.
44
   
          We see then that the Establishment Clause protects the religious freedom of religious 
institutions and their adherents in two ways. First, the excessive entanglement  principle 
precludes the civil courts from becoming involved with matters of religious doctrine or policy, 
and requires that they must defer to the resolution of these issues by the highest tribunal of a 
hierarchial church authority. Second, the Establishment Clause, here sometimes interacting with 
the Free Exercise Clause, prevents the application of general laws to the activities of religious 
institutions where this would result in an interference with the religiously-based decisions of the 
religious officials administering those institutions.
45
 
                                                          
 
42
 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C.Cir.1996). 
 
43
 See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991). The teacher was a Protestant and brought a religious 
discrimination claim under Title VII. Title VII contains a “religious entity” exception,” under which religious 
organizations and religious schools may limit employment to persons of their religion. But if the religious 
organization or religious entity does not limit employment to persons of its own religion, it may not avoid the 
application of Title VII. In this case, the Third Circuit, in order to avoid a serious constitutional question,  construed 
the “religious entity” exception very broadly to cover an employee’s conformity with the religious entity’s religious 
beliefs. 
 
44
 Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, 88 F.3d 410 (6
th
 Cir. 1996). However, if the teacher was a woman and 
became pregnant as a result of having sexual relations outside of marriage, she is entitled to show that she was 
discharged because of her pregnancy and not because she had sex outside of marriage, so that her discharge would 
violate the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(k). She can make such a showing by proving 
that the policy against having sex outside of marriage was enforced only against pregnant women and not against 
men or against women who were not pregnant. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651 (6
th
 Cir. 2000).  
In a very recent and post-Hosana-Tabor case, an unmarried non-Catholic technology coordinator at a Catholic 
parochial school was terminated because she became pregnant by means of artificial insemination. The school 
contended that becoming pregnant by means of artificial insemination was a violation of Catholic religious doctrine. 
The court held that the “ministerial exception” did not apply to bar her claims and that for purposes of the school’s 
motion to dismiss, she had made out a plausible claim of pregnancy discrimination. Dias v. Archdiocese of 
Cincinnati, 2012 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 43240, U.S.D.C.S.D. Ohio, March 29, 2012. The court subsequently held, 
following discovery by the parties, that there was a sufficient factual dispute over the reasons for her termination 
that had to be resolved by a trial of the case.Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2013 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 12417, 
U.S.D.C.S.D. Ohio, January 30, 2012. 
 
45
 A different question is presented where the application of general laws to the activities of a religious institution 
would interfere with the decisions of the religious officials administering those institutions, although those decisions 
might not have involved the application of religious doctrine. But a concern that labor relations decisions might have 
involved the application of religious doctrine influenced the Supreme Court to hold Congress did not intend that the 
federal National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. secs. 151-169, apply to the regulate the unionization of lay faculty 
members at parochial schools. National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of the City of Chicago, 440 U.S. 
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490 (1979) The Court said that the National Labor Relations Board’s resolution of unfair labor practices at the 
schools would in many instances involve an inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by clergy-
administrators and its relationship to the school’s“religious mission.” 440 U.S. at 501.  Because of these 
“entanglement” concerns, the Court, invoking the statutory interpretation principle that where possible a statute will 
be interpreted so as to avoid a serious question as to its constitutionality,  concluded that Congress did not intend 
that the Act apply to the unionization of lay faculty members at parochial schools. The Court has also held that 
Congress did not intend that non-profit church-affiliated schools be subject to federal unemployment compensation 
laws. St. Martin Lutheran Evangelical Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981). This decision was based 
primarily on general principles of statutory interpretation rather than on a concern with avoiding a serious 
constitutional question.  However, the Court saw no constitutional problem in applying the federal wages and hours 
law to a commercial business operated by a religious organization and staffed by former drug addicts, derelicts, or 
criminals before their conversion and rehabilitation by the foundation. The foundation was a nonprofit religious 
organization that operated a number of commercial businesses, including service stations, retail clothing and grocery 
outlets, roofing and electrical construction companies, a candy company, and a motel. The converted and 
rehabilitated workers received no cash salaries but were provided with “food, clothing, shelter, and other benefits.”  
Id. at 292. The district court found that these workers were “employees” within the meaning of the federal wages 
and hours law under the “economic reality” test of employment. Id. at 291-292. The Court held that the application 
of the law to the foundation's commercial businesses did not implicate the Free Exercise Clause because the required 
payments in cash to the workers, which they could voluntarily return to the foundation, did not in any way interfere 
with their religious beliefs. Id. at 303. The foundation's “entanglement” objection to the record keeping requirements 
of the law was rejected on the ground that the routine and factual inquires required by the law “bear no resemblance 
to the kind of government surveillance the Court has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government 
entanglement with religion.” Id. at 305. Nor did the Court see any constitutional problem in the application of a state 
sales and use tax to a religious organization's sale of religious materials. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of 
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). See also Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989), 
where the Court held that the Internal Revenue Code's deduction for contributions to charitable and religious 
institutions did not include fixed fees paid for spiritual auditing and training services, because the payments were 
made in exchange for something of value. The Court noted that disallowing such a deduction avoided Establishment 
Clause problems because it did not require the Internal Revenue Service to decide what services and benefits were 
religious in nature. 490 U.S. at 694-698. 
Because Catholic Bishop was decided on statutory interpretation grounds, it does not serve as a binding precedent with 
respect to the application of the Act to non-faculty employees of parochial schools or the application of other federal 
laws to the activities of religious organizations. The United State Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
Catholic Bishop was limited to the unionization of teachers at a parochial school, and that the National Labor 
Relations Act did apply to the unionization of non-faculty personnel, such as child-care workers, cooks, recreation 
assistants, and maintenance workers at a Catholic school for boys. The court also found that the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the unionization of these employees did not violate the Establishment Clause. Because the duties of 
these employees were overwhelmingly secular, the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over them would not involve the 
Board in the school's religious mission, nor would there be any governmental monitoring of the school's religious 
activities.  NLRB v. Hanna Boys Center, 940 F.2d 1295 (9
th
 Cir. 1991), cert.denied, 504 U.S. 1295 (1992).  
         In a similar vein, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the federal Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. secs. 621-634, was applicable to age discrimination claims brought by a lay teacher 
against his parochial school employer. In holding that the application of the law to such claims did not violate the 
Establishment Clause, the court emphasized that the sole question in an age discrimination case was whether an 
employee had been unjustly discriminated against because of age. No Establishment Clause problem would be 
presented when the parochial school employer asserted that the employee was discharged not because of his age, but 
for religiously-based reasons. In such a case the court could not inquire into the plausibility of the religiously-based 
reasons. The inquiry is limited to the question of whether, in fact, the employee was discharged for the asserted 
religiously-based reasons or was discharged because of his age. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 
(2d Cir.1993). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in an age 
discrimination claim brought by the administrator of a Jewish synagogue. Weissman v. Congregation Sharre Emeth, 
38 F.3d 1038 (8
th
 Cir.1994). 
 These cases have not been qualified by subsequent cases and are not affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hosana Tabor, since they involved only lay employees of a religious institution.  As these cases indicate, the mere 
fact that a court or governmental agency exercises jurisdiction over employment relations at a religious institution 
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              Thus far, we have seen how the Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to hold 
unconstitutional governmental actions that have had the effect of favoring one religious belief 
over another religious belief or of favoring religious belief over non-religious belief and 
governmental actions that would have involved the government in matters of religious doctrine 
and policy. We have said that these declarations of unconstitutionality have protected the 
religious freedom of those persons who do not share the favored religious beliefs and have 
protected the religious freedom of religious institutions and their adherents. We now turn to the 
Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause where the Court has found that the challenged 
law or governmental action does not violate the Establishment Clause and will demonstrate how 
these decisions also have had the effect of protecting the religious freedom of religious 
institutions and religious adherents. 
 
C. The Inclusion of the Religious with the Secular in the Receipt of Governmental Benefits     
 
            First, applying the doctrine of the non-discriminatory inclusion of religion, the Court has 
held that at least in some circumstances, the Establishment Clause permits the government to 
include the religious with the secular in the receipt of governmental benefits. To the extent that 
the government is permitted under the Establishment Clause to include the religious with the 
secular in the receipt of governmental benefits, the Establishment Clause thus protects the 
religious freedom of those religious individuals and religious institutions that are permitted to 
receive the benefit. 
 
          The most important benefit for religious institutions resulting from this interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause is that the Court has held that a property tax exemption for non-profit 
institutions that includes churches and religious institutions, did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.
46
 The inclusion of church property in the exemption was said to promote “benevolent 
neutrality” toward religion,47 and avoided the “entanglement” problems that could result from 
governmental valuation of church property for tax purposes and enforcement of the tax against 
church property.
48
  
 
 Nonetheless, the property tax exemption for church property conferred a very valuable 
financial benefit on churches, and like any other tax exemption, effectively subsidized the 
churches' activity. The effect of Walz is to allow the state to provide a financial benefit to 
religion through a tax exemption when it could not provide such a benefit through a direct 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
does not necessarily create an entanglement problem. An entanglement problem only arises when the court or 
agency either applies the law to invalidate an action that was religiously-based or is required to interpret religious 
doctrine to resolve the particular dispute. 
 
46
 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 
47
  Walz, 397 U.S. at 669, 671-673. 
 
48
 Id. at 674-676. 
Forum on Public Policy 
14 
grant.
49
 Crucial to the Court's holding in Walz is the matter of inclusion. The tax exemption was 
for all non-profit institutions. Therefore, churches qualified for the grant, not because they were 
churches, but because they were included within the class of non-profit institutions. As one 
commentator put it, “those institutions shared a relevant nonreligious attribute with secular 
institutions.”50 There is no doubt that a property tax exemption for churches alone would violate 
the Establishment Clause as a preference for religion, notwithstanding that such an exemption 
would avoid the “entanglement” problems that the Court identified in Walz. This point is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Court has held unconstitutional an exemption from the state 
sales tax law for “[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that 
consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly 
of writings sacred to a religious faith.”51 In other words, it is the matter of the inclusion of the 
religious with the secular that marks the distinction between the constitutionally permissible 
equal treatment of religion and the constitutionally impermissible preference for religion.
52
   
                                                          
 
49
 See William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment. 59 S.CAL. L. 
REV. 495, 500-501 (1986). Professor Marshall notes that the tax exemption in Walz provided a more significant 
benefit to religion than any other, so that the result is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause objective of 
prohibiting financial aid to religion.  Professor Choper also attacks the result in Walz as endangering religious 
liberty because the effect of the exemption is to allow tax funds to be expended for religious purposes. See Jesse H. 
Choper, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
RELIGION CLAUSES 37 (1995).. 
 
50
 Abner S. Greene, “The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses,” 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1627 (1993). 
 
51
 Texas Monthly,Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 
52
 See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 184 (1992). As Professor 
McConnell has observed: “When the government provides no financial support to the nonprofit sector except for 
churches, it aids religion. But when the government provides financial support to the entire nonprofit sector, 
religious and nonreligious institutions alike, on the basis of objective criteria, it does not aid religion. It aids higher 
education, health care, or child care; it is neutral to religion.” 
By the same token, the government does not violate the Establishment Clause when it provides financial aid to a 
religious institution, such as a religiously-affiliated hospital, to enable that institution to perform a secular function. 
The funding has a secular purpose (the first Lemon principle), and does not have the primary effect of advancing 
religion (the second Lemon principle), and so the funding does not violate the Establishment Clause. See Bradfield 
v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), where in what appears to be the first Establishment Clause case to come before the 
Supreme Court, the Court saw no possible Establishment Clause objection to Congress’ providing funding to a 
Washington, D.C. charitable hospital operated by a religious order pursuant to a contractual arrangement by which 
the hospital agreed to devote two-thirds of its patient capacity for indigent District of Columbia residents. The Court 
will also assume that the religious institution will carry out the secular function “in a lawful, secular manner,” and 
will not use the funding to achieve religious objectives. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), where the 
Court held that the government could include a religiously-affiliated organization in a program of grants to private 
organizations to provide counseling for the prevention of adolescent sexual relations and care for pregnant 
adolescents and adolescent parents. The Court also held that it would not presume that the organization would use 
the grant to advance its religious views on adolescent sexual relations, and that only if such a showing could be 
made by opponents of the grant would the grant be revoked. 
The proposition that the government can provide funding to religiously-affiliated institutions in order to enable them 
to perform a secular function has been relied on by the Supreme Court to uphold federal assistance to church-
affiliated colleges and universities. Crucial to this holding was the Court's “constitutional finding of fact” that most 
church-affiliated colleges and universities are sufficiently similar to secular colleges and universities in their 
educational operation, so that providing them with governmental  funding will not have the effect of “advancing 
religion.” Nonetheless, the particular funding program involved in these cases did not take the form of a general 
grant to the institution, but was targeted for specific secular purposes and was upheld on that basis. Where a church-
affiliated college or university operates a distinctly sectarian program, such as a divinity school, an unrestricted 
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Because the inclusion of the religious with the secular in the receipt of a governmental benefit 
does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause, an Establishment Clause violation would 
only occur when the inclusion of the religious in the particular benefit is inconsistent with a 
specific Establishment Clause principle or doctrine. We have earlier discussed governmental 
financial assistance to the educational function of parochial schools.
53
 The Court has held that 
governmental financial assistance that takes the form of “aid to the school”, such as paying the 
salaries of parochial school teachers of secular subjects, violates the Establishment Clause, 
notwithstanding that the government also pays the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in the 
public schools.
54
 The government would also violate the Establishment Clause by sending public 
school teachers of basic subjects into the parochial schools, since this form of financial 
assistance would “relieve sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in 
educating their students” and would “have the effect of advancing religion by creating a financial 
incentive to undertake sectarian education.”55  The same would be true of a program providing 
grants to both parochial and public schools for the repair of school buildings.
56
 
 
           However, while the Court has held that governmental assistance to the educational 
function of parochial schools is unconstitutional when the assistance takes the form of “aid to the 
school,” in the leading case of Everson v. New Jersey,57 the Court drew a sharp distinction 
between “aid to the school” and “aid to the child” who is attending a parochial school. Because 
of the necessary admixture of the religious and secular in parochial school education, in Everson 
the Court proceeded on the assumption that any form of direct governmental assistance to 
parochial schools would violate the Establishment Clause, since it would advance the religious 
function of the schools.
58
 But at the same time the Court held that the Establishment Clause is 
not violated when the governmental funding takes the form of “aid to the child” who is attending 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
grant would presumably violate the Establishment Clause because it would have the effect of supporting, to some 
degree, the institution's sectarian program .See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (involving 
grants to defray part of expense of educating students in private colleges and universities, including grants to 
religiously-affiliated institutions that had given “adequate assurance that funds would be used for a secular 
purpose”); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (involving state-issued revenue bonds that could be used by 
church-affiliated colleges and universities to borrow funds to finance construction of facilities used for secular 
purposes); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S, 672 (1971)(involving federal construction grants to church-affiliated 
colleges and universities for buildings and facilities used exclusively for secular purposes). Because these church-
affiliated colleges and universities are considered to be essentially secular institutions, there is also no Establishment 
Clause problem when the government provides financial assistance to students attending such colleges.  See e.g., 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Blanton, 433 F.Supp. 97 (M.D.Tenn.), aff’d. mem., 434 
U.S. 803 (1977). But if a particular church-affiliated college or university is found by a court to be a primarily 
sectarian institution, any governmental aid to that institution, of course, violates the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., 
Habel v. Industrial Dev. Auth., 400 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1991) (holding that Jerry Falwell's Liberty University was a 
sectarian institution so that the city's issuance of construction bonds for educational facilities at the university 
violated the Establishment Clause). 
 
53
 See the discussion, supra, notes 13-16, and accompanying text. 
 
54
 See the discussion of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), supra, note 16, and accompanying text. 
 
55
 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 
56
 See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra note 14. 
 
57
 Supra, note 2. 
 
58
 Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-16. 
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the parochial school. Once the Court drew this distinction in Everson,
59
 it was clear that the 
state’s providing bus transportation to parochial school students in that case fell on the side of 
“aid to the child” and so was constitutionally permissible. Applying the Everson precedent, the 
Court has held that a state could constitutionally provide parochial school students with the same 
kinds of individual-based benefits that it provides to public school students, such as loaning the 
parochial school students the same textbooks in secular subjects that it loaned to public school 
students,
60
 including parochial school students in programs that loaned the students educational 
materials and equipment such as library books and computer hardware and software,
61
 providing 
diagnostic services in which state employees would go into the parochial schools to test 
individual children for particular health and educational problems,
62
 providing a sign-language 
interpreter for a hearing-impaired student at a parochial school when it provided a sign-language 
interpreter for hearing-impaired students in the public schools,
63
 and sending public school 
teachers into the parochial school buildings to teach certain “enrichment” secular subjects and to 
provide remedial instructional services for low-income students.
64
 The permissibility of aid to 
children attending parochial schools was relied on by the Court to hold that where the state 
established a program to enable students with disabilities to receive an education so that they 
could acquire a marketable skill, the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by paying the 
tuition of a blind student to attend a sectarian college in order to receive an education that would 
enable him to pursue a religious vocation.
65
   However, while the state is permitted by the 
                                                          
 
59
 While this distinction has been criticized by some academic commentators as focusing on the form of aid rather 
than on its substance and effect, see e.g., William P. Marshall, “Toward a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional 
Conditions: The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L.REV. 243, 246-47 (1989), it has been 
consistently applied and never questioned by the Court.  
 
60
 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
 
61
 Mitchell v.Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). Here the program took the form of the federal government distributing 
funds to state and local governmental agencies that in turn loaned the educational materials and equipment to 
elementary schools, including private and parochial schools. The materials provided to the private and parochial 
schools had to be “secular, neutral and nonideological.” Five Justices took the position that the program had to 
contain “divertibility” safeguards to ensure that the materials and equipment would not be used for religious 
purposes. Two of these Justices found that the program had adequate “divertibility” standards, and combined with 
the four Justices who took the position that “divertibility” standards were not required, since the funds were 
allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria, resulted in a 6-3 majority to uphold the constitutionality of the 
program. 
 
62
 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). See also Lemon, 330 U.S. at 616, discussing the providing of school 
lunches to parochial school students. Providing individualized services or school lunches or immunizations to 
parochial school students in the parochial schools means only that the school is the conduit for the distribution of a 
governmental benefit to the children. 
 
63
 Zoberst v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
 
64
  Agostini v. Felton, supra, note 55. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). The significance of Agostini in this regard was that the 
Court had previously held that the remedial instructional services could not be provided in the parochial school itself 
because of concerns that doing so would create an impermissible “symbolic union” between the state and the 
parochial school. As a result, these remedial instructional services were provided off-premises, usually in mobile 
facilities parked on the parochial school grounds. These prior holdings were overruled in Agostini. So long as public 
school employees provide the remedial instruction, they can do so in the parochial school building.  
 
65
 Witters v. Washington Department of Social Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) The purpose of the 
program was to enable students with disabilities to receive an education so that they could acquire a marketable 
skill, and the most logical place for him to do so would be at a sectarian college. 
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Establishment Clause to include religious study in a program of financial assistance to college 
students, it is not required by the Free Exercise Clause to do so. For this reason, a state does not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause when it denies financial assistance to a student pursuing a 
degree in “devotional theology.” Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). The state’s refusal to 
provide financial assistance to a student pursuing a degree in “devotional theology” was based on 
a “no aid provision” in the state constitution, Wash.Const., Art. I, sec. 11, which states that, “No 
public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise 
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.” The Court held that the ban on 
funding for study in “devotional theology” advanced a valid state “anti-establishment” interest 
and noted that the state did provide scholarships for study at pervasively sectarian institutions so 
long as the student was not pursuing a degree in “devotional theology.” 540 U.S. at 724-725. 
Compare Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10
th
 Cir.2008), where the 
court found unconstitutional as distinguishing between religions, a state scholarship program that 
provided funding for students attending sectarian institutions, but denied funding for students 
attending institutions that were “pervasively sectarian.” 
           Closely related to the distinction between constitutionally impermissible “aid to the 
school” and constitutionally permissible “aid to the child” is the distinction between “aid to the 
school” and “aid to the parents of children attending a parochial school.” The state assists the 
educational function of parochial schools when it gives tax benefits to parents who send their 
children to parochial schools. Presumably, this form of aid reduces the costs of parochial school 
education and therefore, provides a financial incentive for parents to send their children to 
parochial schools. In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist
66
 the 
Court held unconstitutional the state’s grant of a tax credit for school tuition paid by parents 
whose children were attending private or parochial schools. The Court reasoned that by lowering 
the costs of parochial school education for these parents, the state was subsidizing parochial 
school education, and held that this subsidization violated the Establishment Clause.
67
 However, 
in the later case of Mueller v. Allen,
68
 the Court held that there was no Establishment Clause 
violation when the state allowed all parents across the board to take a tax deduction, as opposed 
to a tax credit, for educational expenses, notwithstanding that 96% of the deductions were taken 
for parochial school tuition. 
 
           Some academic commentators were troubled by the implications of the Mueller decision, 
especially insofar as it indicted that the Establishment Clause was not violated, simply because 
the tax deduction made it easier for parents to exercise a private choice to send their children to 
parochial schools.
69
 There is no doubt that the Court could have held that the tax deduction in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
66
 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 
67
 413 U.S. at 794. 
 
68
 463 U.S.388 (1983). 
 
69
 See Gary J. Simson, “The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 905, 926 (1987). Professor Simson says that the tax deduction has a substantial effect of 
supporting religion with public funds….” Although a tax deduction is not an expenditure of public funds in form, it 
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Mueller, like the tax credit in Nyquist, violated the Establishment Clause, because the practical 
effect of the deduction was to subsidize parochial school education. But the Court did not do so. 
Again, as we saw with respect to the property tax exemption for non-profit institutions that 
includes churches and religious institutions, it is precisely the inclusion of the religious with the 
secular in a receipt of a governmental benefit that marks the distinction between the 
constitutionally permissible equal treatment of religion and the constitutionally impermissible 
preference for religion. Here the tax deduction was one of many provided by the state to 
taxpayers, it was available to all parents who incurred educational expenses, and the decision to 
use the tax deduction to defray the cost of parochial school education was the result of the 
private choice by parents to send their children to parochial schools. Mueller thus holds that he 
state may provide tax benefits for parents of all schoolchildren, notwithstanding that most of the 
tax benefits are claimed by parents of children attending parochial schools. 
 
            The matter of “aid to the parents of children attending parochial schools” and “individual 
choice” proved dispositive in the Court’s 2002 decision of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,70 where 
the Court first addressed the question of whether the Establishment Clause prohibited state-
sponsored voucher programs that included vouchers to defray the cost of attendance at parochial 
schools. The facts of that case are very important in regard to the inclusion of the religious with 
the secular in the receipt of a   governmental benefit. In that case, Ohio had set up a pilot 
program designed to increase the choices of lower-income parents with children in the Cleveland 
public schools, which, according to the Court, “have been among the worst performing public 
schools in the Nation.”71 The program contained both a tuition aid component and a tutorial aid 
component. Under the tuition aid component, private schools, both non-religious and parochial, 
could participate in the program and accept eligible students, so long as the school was located 
within the boundaries of the Cleveland school district. Public schools located in a district 
adjacent to the Cleveland school district could also participate in the program. All the 
participating schools were required to accept Cleveland school students in accordance with rules 
promulgated by the state superintendent. Tuition aid was distributed to parents according to 
financial need. If the parents chose a private or parochial school, checks were made payable to 
the parents, who then endorsed the checks over to the chosen school
72
 Virtually all of the 
students participating in the tuition grant program enrolled in parochial schools. In addition to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
plainly is so in fact. Moreover, by relieving parents of a tangible part of the cost of educating their children in public 
schools, this deduction materially increases the likelihood that parents contemplating sending their children to 
parochial school will decide to do so.”; Jesse H. Choper,”The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools - 
An Update, 75 CAL.L.REV. 5, 9-10 (1987).. Professor Choper says that Mueller is indistinguishable from Nyquist. 
In both instances, the state was trying to provide some financial relief to parents who sent their children to private 
schools, including parochial schools.Id. at 8. He contends that it should not matter that the law in Mueller was 
facially neutral, while the law in Nyquist expressly favored religion, as the record showed that 96% of the tax 
deductions under the law were taken for parochial school payments. Id. at 9. He concludes that the decision in 
Mueller “opened a large window for aid to parochial schools.” Id. at 11. 
 
70
 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 
71
 Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 644. 
 
72
 Id. at 645-646. 
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the tuition aid and tutorial assistance programs, the Cleveland school district set up programs for 
community or charter schools, which were funded by the state, but were operated by their own 
school boards instead of by the Cleveland school district. For each child enrolled in a community 
school, the school received state funding that was twice the funding received by a school 
participating in the tuition aid program. The school district also operated magnet schools that 
emphasized a particular subject area, teaching method or service to students. For each student 
enrolled in a magnet school, the school district received the same amount of funding as it 
received for students enrolled at a traditional public school.
73
 
 
         In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the inclusion of vouchers for parochial schools in the 
Cleveland tuition assistance program did not violate the Establishment Clause. The opinion of 
the Court by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined in by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and 
Thomas, invoked the “aid to the parent” and “private choice” rationale of Mueller and other 
cases.
74
 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, these cases “make clear that where a government 
aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and that provides assistance directly to a broad 
class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of 
their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to a 
challenge under the Establishment Clause.”75 This was because, “A program that shares these 
features permits government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate 
choice of numerous individual recipients,” so that, “The incidental advancement of a religious 
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the 
individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of the 
benefits.”76 The Chief Justice went on to point out that there were no “financial incentives” that 
would “skew” the program toward parochial schools, since the aid was “allocated on the basis of 
neutral, secular criteria that neither favor or disfavor religion,” and that in fact the program 
created “financial disincentives” for religious schools, with private and parochial schools 
receiving only half the assistance given to charter schools and only one-third the assistance given 
to magnet schools.
77
 He also rejected the contention that the state was creating a public 
perception that it was “endorsing religious practices and beliefs,” since the program was a 
neutral one of private choice, “where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the 
numerous independent decisions of private individuals,” and that there was no evidence that the 
                                                          
 
73
 Id. at 648.   Approximately 75,000 students were enrolled in the Cleveland school district when these programs 
went into operation. About 3,700 students were enrolled in the tuition aid program, about 1,400 received tutorial 
assistance, about 1,900 were enrolled in charter schools, and about 13,000 were enrolled in magnet schools. Id. at 
646-648. 
 
74
 Including Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986),  and Zoberst v. 
Catalina Foothills School District,  509 U.S. 1 (1993) 
 
75
 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. 
 
76
 Id.  
 
77
 Id.  at 653. 
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program failed to provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular 
educational opportunities for their school-age children.”78 
 
           The Zelman decision provides a roadmap for states and school districts wishing to adopt 
voucher programs that include vouchers for attendance at parochial schools. The voucher 
program must be filtered through the parents of children attending parochial schools and must 
include a number of other alternatives to the use of vouchers for attendance at parochial schools. 
However, the use of voucher programs since Zelman has been relatively limited, and while a 
number of voucher programs of one sort or another have been adopted, voucher programs, 
particularly those that include vouchers for attendance at parochial schools, have not become a 
major part of the American educational system.
79
 Be that as it may, Zelman is another example 
of the permissible inclusion of the religious with the secular in the receipt of governmental 
benefits. 
           By drawing a sharp distinction between the constitutionally impermissible “aid to the 
school” and the constitutionally permissible “aid to the child,” including aid to the parents of 
children attending parochial schools, the Court has enabled the government to provide significant 
                                                          
 
78
 Id. at 655. Justices O’Connor and Thomas, in a concurring opinion, insisted that the decision was not a “dramatic 
break from the past,” and emphasized that a “true private choice” inquiry “should consider all reasonable 
educational alternatives to religious schools that are available to parents.” 536 U.S. at 663 (O’Connor,J., 
concurring). Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented, insisting that public funds would be 
supporting the teaching of religion and that this result was not obviated by the fact that the governmental support for 
the teaching of religion comes about through “private choice.”  536 U.S. at 669-700 (Souter, J., dissenting. 
 
79
 For discussions of voucher programs since 2002, see Jim Carl, “Freedom of Choice [electronic resource]; 
vouchers in American education (Praeger 2011) (“[t]he growth of school vouchers has been anemic since 2002"); 
Lenford C. Sutton & Richard A. King, “School Vouchers in a Climate of Political Change, “ 36 JOURNAL OF 
EDUCATION FINANCE 244-267, Winter, 2011); “Keeping Informed About School Vouchers,” CENTER ON 
EDUCATION POLICY, July, 2011). 
  There are three reasons why voucher programs have not become a major part of the American educational system.. 
In the first place, the Court in Zelman made it clear that vouchers for attendance at private and parochial schools 
must be only one component of a larger program involving a number of other alternatives for parents of children 
enrolled in the public schools. This being so, a state or school district cannot do vouchers “on the cheap,” so to 
speak, but must devote considerable resources to providing other alternatives. Second and more importantly, 39 
states have state constitutional “no aid” provisions that preclude the use of state funds for the support of “sectarian 
or denominational schools,” see Sutton and King, “School Vouchers” at 248-251, Table 2, for a summary of “no 
aid” clauses in state constitutions, and these and related provisions, such as “uniformity” and “local control,” have 
been interpreted by some state courts as prohibiting voucher programs that include vouchers for attendance at 
parochial schools. See Cain v. Horn, 220 Ariz. 77, 202 P.2d 1178 (2009); Chittenden Town School District v. 
Department of Education, 169 Vt. 310, 738 A.2d 539 (1999); Owens v. Colorado Congress of Parents, Teachers and 
Students, 92 P.2d 933 (Colo.2004); Holmes v. Bush, 919 So.2d 392 (Fla.2006). Third, and probably most 
importantly, has been the rise in charter schools, which are publicly-funded non-sectarian schools operated under 
contract between the state or public school systems and private companies. Charter schools give parents of children 
attending public schools an alternative to avoid the public schools, often with a greater degree of parental control. 
The availability of charter schools, has clearly reduced public pressure for voucher programs. According to Mr. 
Carl, “Freedom of Choice,” at 199, as of 2010, charter schools operated in 40 states and the District of Columbia, 
enrolling nearly 2 million students. He suggests that, “In the first decade of the new century, state legislatures and 
voters were more attracted to charter schools than they were to voucher programs, perhaps because charter schools 
avoided church state entanglements.” So, while the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of voucher 
programs that include vouchers for attendance at parochial schools, such programs are not widespread in the United 
States today. 
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financial assistance to the educational function of parochial schools. 
80
 And to this extent, the 
Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause has served to protect the religious freedom of 
parents who want their children to attend parochial schools. 
 
            Second, again applying the principle of the non-discriminatory inclusion of religion, the 
Court has held that providing religious groups along with secular groups  with the equal access to 
public facilities for purposes of expression does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court 
has held that providing equal access to public facilities for religious groups does not have the 
effect of advancing religion, it does not create a symbolic union between government and 
religion, and it does not constitute governmental endorsement of the religious group's message. 
Once the Court has held that providing equal access to religious groups does not violate the 
Establishment Clause,  the freedom of expression component of the First Amendment comes into 
play. Under the First Amendment principle of content neutrality and the public forum doctrine, 
whenever the government designates public property or facilities as a public forum, it must 
provide all groups equal access to the property for the purpose of expression. Since providing 
equal access to religious groups for purposes of expression does not violate the Establishment 
Clause, the government is constitutionally required to provide such access under the First 
Amendment’s public forum doctrine.81  This is another example of how the Court’s 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause has resulted in protecting the religious freedom of 
individuals and religious institutions. 
 
D. Governmental Actions Protecting the Religious Freedom of Individuals and Religious 
Institutions 
We have previously pointed out that the Establishment Clause renders unconstitutional certain 
actions that directly interfere with the religious freedom of individuals and religious 
institutions.
82
 Moreover, as we have discussed previously, under the third Lemon principle of 
                                                          
 
80
 In an interesting article, Professor Richard C. Schragger, says that the effect of the Zelman v. Harris” aid to the 
parent rational is to insulate the public subsidization of private religious activity from Establishment Clause concern 
and to eliminate inquiry into matters such as “divertibility” or the “pervasively sectarian” character of the institution 
to which the aid flows. The only constitutional requirement, he says, is one of neutrality and even-handedness. 
Richard C. Schragger, “The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty,” 117 
HARV.L.REV. 1810, 1857-58 (2004). 
 
81
 See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (statehouse plaza dedicated as a 
public forum); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (after-school use of 
school facilities by private groups); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) 
(facilities of public schools available for use by student groups); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (facilities 
of state university available for use by student groups); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) 
(university’s policy of paying printing costs of student publications as applied to require payment of printing costs 
for publication of student religious organization). See also, John H. Garvey, “All Things Being Equal . . ., 1996 
B.U.LREV. 587, 588-92 discussing the interaction between the Establishment Clause, the First Amendment public 
forum doctrine, and the content neutrality principle in this situation.. 
 
82
 See the discussion, supra, note 27. Since the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from giving a 
preference for one religion over another religion, the Court has held that it violates the Establishment Clause for a 
state to require the registration as a charitable organization and so subject to more extensive regulation of those 
religious groups that receive more than half their funds from non-members. Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
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excessive entanglement, the civil courts may not become involved with matters of religious  
doctrine or policy, but must defer to the resolution of these issues by the highest tribunal of a 
hierarchial church authority.
83
 Finally, as we have discussed previously, the excessive 
entanglement principle may prevent application of general laws to the activities of religious 
institutions.
84
 
 
          Now we will discuss how the Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to uphold as 
constitutional affirmative efforts on the part of the government to protect the religious freedom 
of individuals and religious institutions. Here we see the interaction of the Establishment Clause 
with the Free Exercise Clause to advance the constitutional value of religious freedom. The 
operative principle in this area may be stated as follows. Governmental action that has the effect 
of providing a preference for religion over non-religion violates the Establishment Clause. But 
governmental action that is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and 
religious institutions does not violate the Establishment Clause. The crucial question in these 
cases, therefore, is whether the governmental action is an unconstitutional preference for 
religion, or a precisely tailored and so constitutionally permissible means of protecting the 
religious liberty of individuals and religious institutions.
85
 
  
           Let me explain why this is so. When the government gives a preference for religion over 
non-religion, it is violating the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause, which is that the 
government must pursue a course of complete official neutrality toward religion. This overriding 
principle is not obviated by the claim that the government is trying to make an “accommodation” 
for religion. It is precisely because the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is one of 
complete official neutrality toward religion that the government may not make an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Similarly, both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause invalidate laws that expressly discriminate 
against religion or against people because of their religious beliefs, such as a law that disqualifies members of the 
clergy from serving as legislators, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), or a law requiring the declaration of a 
belief in the existence of God as a test for holding public office. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Art.VI, 
cl.3 of the Constitution specifically prohibits a religious test as a qualification for holding federal office. The 
Torasco decision requires the same result under the Establishment Clause, so that this prohibition binds the states as 
well. 
 
83
  See the discussion, supra, notes 28-30, and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court stated in Everson, supra 
note 2 at 16: “Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice-versa.”Thus, the courts cannot interfere with the decisions of the 
appropriate ecclesiastical authority within the church as to what persons are entitled to serve as ecclesiastical 
officials. Nor may they become involved in disputes between church factions over control over church property, 
with each group claiming to have the “true faith,” but must defer to the determination of which group has the “true 
faith” that has been made by the highest tribunal of a hierarchial church organization. 
 
84
 See the discussion, supra, notes 31-45, and accompanying text. This application of the excessive entanglement 
principle was involved in the Supreme Court’s most recent Establishment Clause decision, Hosana Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 132 Sup.Ct. 694 (2012), where the Court held that there was a ministerial exception to 
anti-discrimination laws, and that only the religious institution could decide who had the status of a “minister” under 
religious law. 
 
85
 I have discussed this interaction more fully under the heading of “Preference for Religion” and the subsidiary 
doctrine of “Accommodation for Religious Freedom, But Not for Religion,” in Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the 
Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional Litigation, supra, note 12 at 1419-1437.  
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“accommodation” for religion by giving a preference for religion over non-religion. Thus, the 
Court has found a preference for religion in violation of the Establishment Clause in the 
following  cases: a state law providing an exemption from the state sales tax for religious 
periodicals alone; 
86
a state law that gave churches the power to prevent the issuance of a liquor 
license to a business that would be located within 500 feet of the church;
87
 a state law setting up 
a special school district embracing the boundaries of a religious community;
88
 and a state law 
entitling an employee to take off work on the day that the employee stated that he or she 
observed as the Sabbath, without any requirement that the employee’s religion precluded the 
employee from working on the Sabbath or even that the employee used that day for religious 
purposes.
89
 
 
           Conversely, when the government takes action that is precisely tailored to protect the 
religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions, the government is acting to protect the 
religious freedom that is the primary concern of both the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause. Since religious freedom is a favored constitutional value under the American 
Constitution, it would be inconsistent with the overriding purpose of the religion clauses, taken 
together, to hold that the Establishment Clause precludes the government from taking such 
action. It is irrelevant in this regard that the failure of the government to take such action and that 
the application of facially neutral laws to individuals and religious institutions would not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause.
90
 The measure of what the government cannot constitutionally do is 
not the measure of what the government is constitutionally permitted to do. So long as the 
government’s action is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and 
religious institutions, that action advances the overriding purpose of the religion clauses and so 
does not violate the Establishment Clause. 
  
           In order to satisfy the standard of “precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of an 
individual or religious institution,” the action must be directed toward obviating an interference 
with religious freedom. An interference with an individual’s religious freedom occurs when the 
individual is prevented from doing something that his or her religion requires, such as when a 
member of the Native-American Church is being prevented from using peyote in a religious 
ceremony, or when someone is compelled to do something that the person’s religion prohibits, 
such as being compelled to work on the Sabbath, which the religion dictates be a day of complete 
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 Texas Monthly,Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 
87
 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
 
88
 Board of Education v. Kiryas Joel Village School District, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
 
89
 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
 
90
 As a general proposition, the Free Exercise Clause does not require that the government exempt the religiously-
motivated conduct of individuals from neutral and generally applicable laws. See e.g., Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), where the Court held that the government could constitutionally prohibit the use of 
peyote in the religious services of the Native American Church. See generally the discussion of “The Role of the 
Free Exercise Clause” in Robert A. Sedler, “The Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty in the United 
States,” 2010 FORUM ON PUBLIC POLICY ONLINE, No. 5, pp. 9-11. 
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rest. An interference with the freedom of a religious institution occurs when the law prevents the 
institution from carrying out its religious function, such as a law prohibiting a religious 
institution from employing only its adherents in the religious activities of the institution or a 
zoning law prohibiting the construction of a religious facility in a residential area. 
 
 Applying the standard of “precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of an 
individual or religious institution,” the courts have upheld a number of governmental actions 
directed toward protecting religious freedom against Establishment Clause challenge. The 
Supreme Court has upheld Title VII’s “religious entities” exemption,91 which exempts religious 
institutions from Title VII’s religious discrimination prohibition and permits them to employ 
individuals of the same religion to carry out the work of the institution, including the institution’s 
non-profit secular activities
92
 The Court has also held that Title VII’s prohibition against 
religious discrimination
93
 requires an employer to make a “reasonable accommodation” for an 
employee’s religious beliefs, so long as this can be done without undue hardship on the conduct 
of the employer’s business.94 It may be noted that the “reasonable accommodation” provision has 
been interpreted very narrowly so as to meet the “precisely tailored” standard and so be 
constitutionally permissible. For example, an employer was not required to accommodate a 
Sabbatarian’s effort to avoid Saturday work when this would require the employer to disregard 
the seniority system that had been provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
95
 An 
example of a required “reasonable accommodation” is where two Jewish employees of a skin 
care salon had made a request two weeks in advance that they be permitted to take off work on 
Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish holiday, and where the employer could have reassigned or 
rescheduled their previously-booked appointments.
96
 Another example of a “reasonable 
accommodation” is the “substituted charity” provision of federal labor relations law, which 
enables persons who have religious objections to joining unions to avoid paying union dues or 
representation fees and instead make a charitable contribution in an equivalent amount.
97
 
   
            Other permissible actions designed to protect the religious freedom of individuals and 
religious institutions include: an exemption from the former Sunday closing laws for 
Sabbatarians who closed their businesses on Saturday;
98
 during Prohibition the exemption for 
sacramental wine used in religious services, and a modern equivalent, the exemption from the 
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 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-1. 
 
92
 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 
(1987). 
 
93
 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a)(1).  
 
94
 Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
 
95
 Id. 
 
96
 See EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary,Inc., 108 F.3d 1569 (7
th
 Cir. 1997). 
 
97
 See e.g., Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9
th
 Cir. 1981). 
 
98
 See e.g., Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Arlan’s Dep’t. Store, 357 S.W.2d 808 (Ky.1962), appeal dismissed, 371 
U.S. 218 (1962). In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), where the Court held that the state’s failure to 
provide such an exemption did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, the Court noted that a number of states did 
provide such an exemption, and noted that, “this may well be the wiser solution to the problem.” 366 U.S. at 608. 
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federal substance abuse laws for the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies of Native-
American tribes;
99
an exemption from the federal Eagle Protection Act to permit members of 
Native-American tribes to use eagle feathers in their religious services;
100
 the exemption in the 
federal Humane Slaughter Law for Jewish religious slaughter and now for Halal religious 
slaughter and for the religious slaughter of all religious faiths that use the severance of the 
carotid artery method of slaughter;
101
 an exemption from social security self-employment taxes 
for members of religious sects that have tenets opposed to participation in the social security 
system and that provide reasonable support for their dependent members; 
102
; and an exemption 
for Amish buggies from the requirement that slow-moving vehicles display a special emblem.
103
 
And, of course, the government may take actions to protect the religious freedom of persons 
subject to governmental control, such as the Dearborn, Michigan, public schools making 
arrangements for their Moslem students to pray at required times during school hours, and the 
military and prison systems trying to accommodate the religious needs of persons under their 
control by providing them with chaplains, releasing them for religious services, excusing them 
from uniform requirements, and enabling them to observe religious dietary restrictions.
104 
 
 This brings us to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)
105
 and the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).
106
 In an effort to 
overcome the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to recognize a Free Exercise-based exemption for 
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 See e.g., Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5
th
 Cir. 1991); Olsen v. Drug Enforcement 
Admin., 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C.Cir. 1989). 
 
100
 See Rupert v. Director, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 957 F.2d 32 (1
st
 Cir.1992). In this case, the 
exemption for the use of eagle feathers for religious purposes by members of Native-American tribes was 
challenged by a member of an “all-race” church that followed Native-American religious customs, including the 
ceremonial use of eagle feathers. They asserted that the exemption constituted a preference for one religion over 
another, but the court was able to avoid the religious preference claim by finding that the exemption was based on 
the sovereignty of the Native-American tribes and their special relationship to the federal government. 957 F.2d at 
33-35. C.f. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (the federal government may give employment preference to 
members of Native American tribes in the Bureau of Indian affairs). The courts have also relied on the sovereignty 
and special relationship justification to avoid the religious preference claim in the peyote use cases, supra note 99. If 
the peyote exemption had been for use by all religious groups, as opposed to ordinary drug users, there would be no 
question but that it would be a constitutionally permissible means of protecting the religious liberty of individuals 
and religious institutions. In Gonzales v. O Centro Esp.Benef. Uniao Do Vege., infra, note 108 , the Court  referred 
to the “well-established peyote exception”and noted that this exception “fatally undermines the Government’s 
broader contention that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory system that admits of no 
exceptions under RFRA.” 126 S.Ct. at 1222. 
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 See Droz v. Commissioner of IRS, 48 F.3d 1120 (9
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 Cir. 1995).  
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 See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.1990), holding that such an exemption was required by the 
state constitution and did not violate the Establishment Clause. 
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 See e.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.1985), rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the 
military chaplaincy. Congress has by statute overturned the “uniform headgear” regulation upheld against Free 
Exercise challenge by an observant Jewish service member seeking to wear a skullcap in Goldman v. Weinberger, 
475 U.S. 503 (1986) , so as to permit the wearing of religiously-required headgear by military personnel. See 10 
U.S.C. sec. 774 (1994). 
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religiously-motivated conduct from laws of general application Clause and to protect the 
religious liberty of individuals and religious institutions,
107
 Congress enacted the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The Act applied to all federal and state laws and provided that 
whenever any law “substantially burdened” a person’s exercise of religion, the government had 
to demonstrate that the law was in the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and that 
it was the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. This would be so even if the 
“substantial burden” on a person’s exercise of religion resulted from a rule of general 
applicability. In 1997, the Supreme Court held that the Act was unconstitutional in its application 
to the states as being beyond Congress’ enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
108
 In 2000,Congress came back with RLUIPA, 
109
a much narrower law enacted 
under the spending power, and applicable only to programs or activities receiving federal 
assistance. RLUIPA imposes the compelling governmental interest test to determine the validity 
of land use regulations that impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person or 
religious institution and the validity of institutional regulations that impose a substantial burden 
on the religious practices of institutionalized persons. 
 
 In Cutter v. Wilkinson,
110
 the Supreme Court reviewed a lower court decision holding that  
in its application to prison inmates, RLIPUA violated the Establishment Clause, because it 
favored religious rights over other fundamental rights without any showing that religious rights 
were at any greater risk of deprivation in the prison context.
111
 The Supreme Court unanimously 
reversed that decision held that the application of RLUIPA to protect the religious practices of 
the prison inmates that were at issue in that case did not violate the Establishment Clause.  The 
Court first noted that, it “has long recognized that the government may…accommodate religious 
practices…without violating the Establishment Clause,” and that “‘there is room for play in the 
joints between ‘ the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clauses, allowing the 
government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements, without offense to the 
                                                          
 
107
 See Employment Division v. Smith, supra note 90. In Smith the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
prohibit the government from burdening religious practices through generally applicable laws, and that laws 
imposing such a burden did not have to be justified under the exacting compelling governmental interest standard of 
review. 
 
108
 Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). RFRA still applies to the application of federal laws.In Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418(2006), the Court applied RFRA to invalidate the 
application of Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. sec. 812(c), Schedule I (c), to the use of 
hoasca, a tea containing a hallucinogen, in the religious ceremonies of a very small sect in the United States. The 
Court held that RFRA requires  case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable laws and 
that the government bears the burden of demonstrating that serious harm would result from the granting of specific 
exemptions to particular religious claimants. The government could not sustain its burden in this case, The Court 
also referred to the “well-established peyote exception,” discussed earlier, supra, note 99, and accompanying text, 
and noted that this exception “fatally undermines the Government’s broader contention that the Controlled 
Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under RFRA.” 546 U.S. at 433-
43 
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 Cir. 2005), rev’d, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
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Establishment Clause.”112  It then noted that Congress had documented in hearings spanning 
three years that “‘frivolous or arbitrary” barriers impeded institutionalized persons’ religious 
exercise.”113The Court then found that on its face, RLUIPA “qualifies as a permissible legislative 
accommodation of religion that is not barred by the Establishment Clause.”114  This was because 
it “alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise” and 
“protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are 
therefore dependent on the governments permission and accommodation for exercise of their 
religion.”115 Moreover, RLUIPA would be applied in an “appropriately balanced way with 
particular sensitivity to security concerns.”116 Finally, the Court concluded that the lower court 
had misunderstood the Court’s precedents when it held that the government could not give 
greater protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally protected rights. If this were 
the law, said the Court, “all manner of religious accommodations would fail,” and the Court had 
held in other cases, 
117that religious accommodations need not “come packaged with benefits to 
secular entities.”118 The Court thus upheld against Establishment Clause challenge the provisions 
of RLUIPA requiring the state to make a reasonable accommodation for the religious needs of 
institutionalized persons. The Court’s decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson strongly affirms the 
principle that the government can, consistent with the Establishment Clause, take action that is 
precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.
119
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 544 U.S. at 713, citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 144-145, and 
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,718 (2004). In Locke the Court held that although the state would not be violating the 
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the Free Exercise Clause by prohibiting the use of state scholarship funds for this purpose. See note 64, supra. 
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 Most notably Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, supra, note 92. 
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 544 U.S. at 724, citing Amos, 483 U.S. at 338. 
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 The Supreme Court’s decision in Cutter upholding the constitutionality of the institutionalized persons provisions 
of RLUIPA necessarily upholds the parallel land use provisions of RLUIPA. See e.g.,Westchester Day School v. 
Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353-356 (2d Cir. 2007). There are four such provisions. One provision 
provides that if a land use regulation substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, the government must show 
that the burden serves a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means. Two provisions prohibit 
discrimination against religious institutions. And one provision deals with exclusion by providing that a land use 
regulation may not totally exclude religious assemblies or unreasonably limit religious assemblies, institutions or 
structures within a jurisdiction. The substantial burden and equal terms provisions have been the most important and 
the most frequently litigated. See the summary of the provisions and the discussion in Douglas Laycock and Luke 
W. Goodrich, “RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-Enforced,” 32 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 1021, 1023 (2012). 
No cases involving the land use provisions of RLUIPA have yet reached the Supreme Court. In commenting on the 
lower court RLUIPA cases, Laycock and Goodrich observed as follows: “Over the twelve years since its enactment, 
RLUIPA has proven its worth. Churches have brought numerous successful lawsuits protecting their core First 
Amendment rights and many cases have settled. Local officials are now on notice that they cannot treat churches as 
a disfavored land use, despite the issues with NIMBY neighbors, tax collection, or commercial districts, or fear of 
Muslims or other prejudices among their constituents.” Laycock & Goodrich, supra at 2071. For recent illustrative 
cases involving RLUIPA challenges to land use regulation, see Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery 
County Council, 2013 U.S.App.LEXIS 2211, Jan. 31, 2013; Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 
2012); Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d  1163 (9
th
 Cir. 2011). 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have discussed the role of the Establishment Clause in protecting religious 
freedom in the United States. I have explained that while the Establishment Clause has 
sometimes been referred to as creating a “wall of separation” between church and state, the 
concept of separation of church and state has not in theory or practice guided the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Rather the overriding principle of the Establishment 
Clause has been that the government must maintain a course of complete official neutrality 
toward religion. Under this overriding principle, the government cannot favor one religion over 
another religion and cannot favor religious belief over non-religious belief. To put it another 
way, under the Establishment Clause, the objectives to be achieved by the concept of separation 
of church and state are achieved by the requirement of complete official neutrality toward 
religion. This means that the government may become involved with religion in a number of 
ways so long as it maintains a course of complete official neutrality toward religion.
120
 
 
          It is the thesis of this paper that the guiding force governing the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been a concern with protecting religious freedom. This 
being so, I maintain that the Court has found an Establishment Clause violation only when the 
law or governmental action in question has the potential for interfering with the religious 
freedom of individuals or groups who are not the beneficiaries of that law or governmental 
action. While the cases demonstrate that the Court has found many Establishment Clause 
violations over the years, the Court has also upheld laws or governmental actions that have the 
effect of treating religion equally with non-religion. This trend has been particularly evident in 
recent years with respect to the government’s including the religious with the secular in the 
receipt of governmental benefits. The Court has also upheld against Establishment Clause 
challenge governmental actions that are precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of 
individuals and religious institutions. 
 
           I have discussed the four situations where the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
can be demonstrated to have been guided by a concern for protecting religious freedom. Two of 
these situations are reflected in the cases where the Court has found an Establishment Clause 
violation, and two of these situations are reflected in the situations where the Court has not found 
an Establishment Clause violation. The Court has held unconstitutional under the Establishment 
Clause all governmental actions that have had the effect of favoring one religious belief over 
another religious belief or of favoring religious belief over non-religious belief. In so doing, the 
Court has protected the religious freedom of those persons who do not share the favored 
religious beliefs.
121
 The Court has also protected the religious freedom of religious institutions 
and their adherents by holding that under the Establishment Clause the government cannot 
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121
 See the discussion, supra, notes 12-27, and accompanying text. 
Forum on Public Policy 
29 
become involved in matters of religious doctrine or policy and must respect the religiously-based 
decisions of religious institutions.
122
 At the same time, the Court has held that at least in some 
circumstances, the Establishment Clause permits the government to include the religious with the 
secular in the receipt of governmental benefits, and to that extent the Establishment Clause 
protects the religious freedom of religious institutions and religious adherents.
123
 Finally, the 
Court has held that the Establishment Clause permits the government to take actions that are 
precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.
124
 
 
           The Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions under the Establishment Clause, holding 
what it is that the Establishment Clause prohibits and what it is that the Establishment Clause 
permits, have strongly reinforced and advanced the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom 
in the United States. 
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